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Taming a �wicked�policy problem : a policy overview of property rights and governance of
Africa摧s rangelands
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Key Points : This paper views property rights in dryland Africa as presenting a �wicked�policy problem . Securing rights hasgenerally involved several interrelated and complex processes . Each of these �solutions�shows , is in turn beset by newproblems , key among them are entrenching local participation in decision making , preventing manipulation and capture byelites , lack of accountability of local level institutions and authorities , and the onset of a new generation of user conflicts .Increasing avenues through which dialogue and communication can occur seems one way of creating a shared understanding . Inaddition to cultural and institutional raw materials among groups can serve as a locus for building dialogue . Because wicked
problems are complex , gaining traction necessitates iterative processes that are adequately flexible to accommodate learning andthe adjustment that learning implies .
Key words : property rights ,�wicked�policy problem , Africa , rangelands , governance
Introduction
So much has been w ritten on land and environmental management in Africa摧s drylands over the past four decades . Yetidentifying and implementing �appropriate�property rights regimes remains a daunting challenge for public policy . Propertyrights problems in rangelands exhibit a range of attributes that are broadly characterized as �wicked .�Wicked problems aresubject to multiple and conflicting criteria in their definition and identification of solutions , involve multiple actors , areinterconnected across multiple levels and require decision making at multiple levels , are iterative in nature , are often thesymptoms of broader problems and they persist over time ( Rittel and Weber , １９７３ ) . They are also characterized by powerstruggles and equity issues ( Brooks and Champ , ２００６ ) . To summarize , wicked problems are plagued by uncertainty and arecontroversial . Commentators suggest that wickedness can be addressed and/ or mitigated by increasing interaction andcooperation across multiple stakeholders ( Ellen et al , ２００３ ) . This includes involving relevant stakeholders in problem andsolution identification (Brooks et al , ２００６) in order to gain diverse insights , build networks for collective action , and to allowdecision making to be informed by local positions and knowledge ( Freeman , ２０００ ; Rauscher , １９９９ ) . Centralized , top‐down ,one size fits all policies will not work , but rather flexibility , learning , and stakeholder engagement are necessary steps (Durantand Legge , ２００６) .
Secure and unambiguous property rights ( i .e .institutional arrangements that determine who can access , use , manage , benefitfrom or own) to land and natural resources are widely recognized as important in presenting resource users and land ownerswith a set of incentives that encourage sustainable use and management , and opportunities for drawing economic and otherbenefits . In dryland Africa , in particular , the complexity and contested nature of property rights has for a long time been seenas a disincentive and many governments are currently undertaking a broad range of reforms to remedy this policy problem . This
paper views the property rights problem in Africa摧s as a �wicked�policy problem and identifies those attributes that areassociated with wickedness . It also outlines some of the public policies and actions that have been adopted to mitigate and/ orcope with wickedness . The paper finally reflects on how reform efforts can be strengthened . While many of the property rightsconcerns can be generalized to other sectors and arenas , this discussion focuses on the rangelands of East Africa and SahelianWest Africa , where rangeland management has been a persistent problem , but where there is much scope for learning acrosssub regions .
Why care about Africa摧s drylands ?
There is good reason to care about Africa摧s rangelands . Besides being home to diverse cultures and economies and contributingto the conservation of endangered mammal species and unique ecosystems , Africa摧s rangelands offer a unique opportunity formaking significant inroads in the global efforts to reduce poverty , hunger and in adapting to the threat of climate change .Securing the property rights of groups and individuals is critical to meeting these global challenges . Climate change is anemerging threat that compounds existing insecurities in the drylands . IPCC scenarios predict declines in annual precipitation ofup to １０％ and increased interannual variability of the same magnitude in the coming decades ( IPCC , ２００１) . Declining rainfalland frequent droughts are anticipated to increase pressures on existing drylands resources , amplifying conflict , furthermarginalizing an already impoverished population ( Hess and Cotula , ２００６) .
Drylands ecosystems are interchangeably referred to as savannahs , rangelands , bushlands etc . They cover about ４０％ ofAfrica摧s land mass ( Scholes and Walker , １９９３) and support close to ５０％ of its population ( Thomas et al , ２００２ ; Andersson et
' '
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al , ２００３) . Pastoralists , the dominant groups that inhabit these areas are especially among the poorest in the world ( Lybbert etal , ２００４) . In Kenya for example , the highest incidence of poverty is found in the arid and semi‐arid lands , where more than
６５％ live below the poverty line ( ILRI , ２００６ ) . In Sahelian west Africa , drylands support a broad range of livelihoods andproduction systems : pastoralism ( both nomadic and transhumant ) , agropastoralism and sedentary farming ( Wane , ２００６ ) .Livestock production contributes between １７‐２０％ of GDP (Barry , ２００１) . Pastoralism is the predominant production system inthe semi‐arid and arid areas of East Africa ( Odhiambo , ２００６ ) . In Sudan for example , livestock contributes upto ２５％ of thecountry摧s foreign exchange earnings , while it accounts for ６ .５％ , ７ .５％ and １０％ of GDP in Tanzania , Uganda and Kenyarespectively ( Odhiambo , ２００６) . The potential contribution of drylands to national economies in both East Africa and SahelianWest Africa is undermined by insecure land tenure , a denial of the viability of pastoral economies by policy , and the politicalmarginalization of drylands communities , especially pastoralists ( Odhiambo , ２００６ ; Wane , ２００６ ) . Property rights systems inboth sub regions have been the casualty of top‐down , government‐led nationalization and/ or privatization efforts that havesystematically taken away land and critical resources from local resource users and disempowered local institutions andauthorities for land administration and management ( Niamir‐Fuller and Turner , １９９９ ; Fratkin , １９９７) .
The nature of the good : property regimes for the drylands
In Africa摧s drylands rainfall is scarce , unreliable , concentrated in a short rainy season , and rapidly lost due to highevapotranspiration and run off ( IFAD , ２０００ ) . Drylands also exhibit common pool goods characteristics : an individual摧swithdrawal of CPR goods subtracts from another摧s benefit from it , yet excluding or limiting potential beneficiaries can bechallenging either because of the sheer size of the CPR which can make fencing costly or traditional norms of equity and customswhich may make exclusion undesirable ( Ostrom , １９９０ ) . Difficulty in excluding leads to CPRs being used by multipleindividuals , including unauthorized users , with implications for sustainable use . Overharvesting and degradation is however notinevitable . Where resource users coordinate their strategies and agree to limit the timing , location , quantity and technologies ofresource withdrawal and or develop rules for monitoring and sanctioning one another , resources can be used sustainably( Ostrom , １９９０ ) . Thus the systems of rights and the identities of users can be manipulated to manage the exclusion andsubtractability problems of common pool goods .
While property rights to common pool resources can vary between private , public ( where government officials are managers )and collective rights , the latter are thought to hold distinct advantages in situations where productivity is marginal and variableand the costs of privatization high (Banks , ２００３ , Behnke et al , １９９３ ; Bromley , １９９１ ,１９８９ ; Ostrom , １９９０ ) . These advantagesinclude minimizing risk , promoting equitable access and minimizing production and transactions costs where scale economies canbe acheived ( Niamir‐Fuller , １９９９ , １９９７ ; Quiggin , １９９３ ; Sandford , １９８３ ) . Indeed , if a well‐defined community of usersexists , the costs of maintaining and protecting collective rights can be lower than those of establishing rights for a large numberof individually owned parcels where each individual would have to find and transact with other individuals for every issue thatarises . It is instructive that Africa摧s rangelands , like other semi‐arid areas of the world , support pastoral modes of land use inwhich property regimes , at least over land , are often collective in nature ( Khazanov , １９８４ ; Galaty and Johnson １９９０ ;Sandford , １９８３) . This perspective on rangelands and property rights is reinforced by emerging notions of rangeland ecology ,which suggest that most of Africa摧s rangelands are disequilibrial in nature and that resource sustainability is largely a function ofrainfall variability and not livestock densities as predicted by longstanding equilibrium models ( see contributions in Scoones ,
１９９４ and Behnke et al , １９９３) . Communal or collective tenures are crucial in that they allow stock mobility and opportunisticstrategies by herders as they track heterogeneous resources and manage risk in an uncertain biophysical environment . Whiledisequilibrial theories of African rangelands are useful , with policy implications that match those emerging from the socialsciences , they remain the subject of considerable debate ( Gillsey and Hoffman , ２００７ ; Vetter , ２００５ ; Illius and O�Connor ,
１９９９ ) .
Several aspects of �wickedness�are evident in this section . First , because of difficulties in exclusion , rangelands are subject tomultiple uses by competing interests . Adjudicating these multiple interests and finding solutions can be challenging . Second ,even though social scientists have demonstrated the relative advantages of collective property regimes for the use andmanagement of common pool goods , especially under circumstances of environmental variability , the empirical reality isdifferent . As we shall see in the next section , rangelands in East and West Africa are under different pressures to privatize/individualize . There is disconnect between research on the one hand and policy and practice on the other , suggesting that
pressures to privatize far outweigh current policy solutions . Finally , the state of ecological knowledge on the functioning ofAfrica摧s range ecosystems is not of one mind . This makes makes policy design even more uncertain in a biophysical environmentthat is characterized by such variability .
The �wicked�reality : property rights in Africa摧s drylands
Property rights regimes over much of Africa comprise multiple and overlapping rights , that are authorized by multipleinstitutions across different jurisdictions ( Okoth‐Ogendo , １９８９) . Individuals and groups can hold different rights to the sameresource concurrently or at different times . For example , herders can graze livestock on crop stubble after harvest , or can beallowed rights of way across cultivated fields . These rights can be acquired through customary institutions , religion or statutory
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law and can obtain at different scales eg cultivation at the family level , and grazing at a village or community level . Themultiple , overlapping nature of rights is especially evident in Sahelian West Africa , where livestock and crop systems interfaceclosely across space and in time . The Sahel can be broadly divided into three zones ( Reynaut , ２００１ ) : a northern zone wherepastoralism dominates but occasional occurrence of water can permit some cultivation , a southern zone that is less arid and givento cultivation , and a transitional zone between the northern pastoral and southern agriculture , which is increasingly taken up bycultivation .
This association between pastoralists and cultivators has evolved reciprocal arrangements beneficial to both groups , withlivestock feeding off the stubble of harvested crops while manuring farmers�fields . These interactions are socially mediatedthrough relationships of friendship ( Turner , １９９９) . But these reciprocal arrangements are on the decline . Political instability ,economic vulnerability and recurrent droughts have reduced cooperation and increased conflicts . Farmers are now diversifyinginto livestock keeping and pastoralists have begun to engage in farming ( Raynaut , ２００１ ; Thebaud and Batterbury , ２００１ ;Hoffman , ２００４) . By keeping more livestock than in the past , farmers are less dependent on the pastoral provision of animalsand animal products ( Hoffman , ２００４ ) . Because tenure rules favor cropland , as the act of land clearing by cultivators isrecognized as productive use unlike herding , farmers have increased pressure to privatize resources ( Painter et al , ２００４ ;Konate , ２００３) . This leads to pastoral spaces such as routes , camp sites and watering holes being used for farming activities .Pastoralists are consequently confronted with a severe decline in rangeland and a change in mobility patterns ( Vedeld , １９９６ ;Thebaud et al . , １９９５ ; Turner , １９９９) . Farmer‐herder conflicts in the Sahel are not new and are anticipated to only increase inintensity . Between １９８６ and １９９４ , ９０ people were killed over transhumance conflicts in Benin ( SWAC and OECD) . In additionto diversification at the farmer‐herder interface , there is emerging evidence that market integration is also causing thediversification of livestock producers ( Adriansen , ２００６ ) . For pastoralists in northern Senegal , however , diversification andmarket integration provide a means for them to maintain their pastoral way of life .
Diversification is also a growing trend in East Africa , especially as pastoralists subdivide collectively‐held group ranches andsettle on individual parcels ( Lesorogol , under review ) . Herders are now cultivating , engaging in petty trade and in wage labor .While livelihoods diversification can work to reduce climate and other risks it is , especially for cultivation , a desperate effortthat often involves unsustainable , low return , high risk activities ( Little et al , ２００６) . Subdivisions are also simulated to resultin reduced viability of subdivided plots , in substantial reductions in livestock numbers ( threatening food security ) and in adecline of wildlife populations ( Thornton et al , ２００６ ; Boone et al , ２００５ ; Homewood , ２００４ ; Lamprey and Reid , ２００４ ) . Itlowers child nutrition and well‐being ( Fratkin , ２００４ ) , and increases social differentiation due to wealthier individuals beingallocated larger parcels at the expense of livestock poor individuals and widows ( Mwangi , ２００７a) . It also weakens the socialties that are the basis of land access , use and management ( Meinzen‐Dick and Mwangi , in press) . While subdivision clearlycircumscribes mobility , there is an increased tendency of individual parcel owners to renegotiate access through the use of arange of institutions , including kinship and friendship ( Mwangi , ２００７a ; Burnsilver and Mwangi , ２００６) . Subdivision is arguedto be a defensive strategy used by individuals to bring the locus of decision making back to the individual as against to acompromised and opportunistic management committee as was the case before subdivision ( Mwangi , ２００７b , ２００６) . In additionto privatization , pastoral areas in East Africa are also the site of increased population migrations from densely populated areas ,are seeing greater urban expansion and competition with commercialized agriculture and more recently , the introduction ofcapital‐intensive investments such as flower farming ( Fratkin , １９９７) .
In both East and Sahelian West Africa , drylands are occupied by multiple users exploiting overlapping niches in the landscape ,with multiple , conflicting demands . These conflicts and additional developments are leading to tenure insecurity , enclosures ,loss of mobility , the diversification of livelihoods , and even more conflict . In both areas , some users ( such as cultivating
groups) are better positioned politically and supported by broader policies which recognize their contribution to development aslegitimate , and which subsequently privilege individualized property rights as the most viable pathway to investment andsustainable land management . Yet there is growing empirical evidence to demonstrate that low‐input mobile pastoralism is a farmore efficient use of marginal productivity rangelands and those collective holdings are more productive and sustainable thanindividual parcels .
Property rights in the drylands of East Africa and Sahel West Africa are beset by various challenges that display elements ofwickedness . First , they are of a legal plural nature , with customary , religious and statutory institutions in a somewhat uneasycoexistence . These multiple authorities can potentially create ambiguities . Some authorities such as the central state cansometimes lack legitimacy especially at local levels . Second , rights and interests are multiple and overlapping , making itdifficult to balance the claims of different and conflicting resource users , legitimate or otherwise . In fact , some users and usesare at the lower end of a power continuum with their needs and contributions accorded lower priority in development policy .Third , those relationships of power are characteristic also of within group interactions , to the extent that some actors such aswomen , youths and poorer herders are excluded from decision making or their claims and rights disregarded . Fourth , thechallenge of a risky ecological setting , whose science is evolving towards a more precise characterization of the relationships ofits components , tends to confuse property regime/ resource access options for practitioners .
Public policy interventions that are anticipated to moderate these problems have been proposed . These include : the recognition
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and strengthening of customary institutions ; the recognition of pastoral land tenures ; improving capacities for conflictresolution and negotiation ; and an increasing role for state actors in arbitrating conflicts . These proposals are consistent withstrategies for mitigating wickedness that were listed in the first section of this paper and are explored in the following section .
Mitigating �wickedness�: land and governance reforms in East Africa and Sahelian West Africa
Recognition of customary and group rights in Uganda and Tanzania In １９９９ the Tanzanian government passed the Village LandAct and the Land Act . The aim of these new laws was to clarify existing land rights , to facilitate the development of landmarkets to encourage investors , facilitate equitable land distribution and to allow women to own land ( Roughton , ２００７ ) . Wiley( ２００３) provides a comprehensive review of Tanzania摧s Land Act from which the following brief is abstracted . The Village LandAct devolves authority over land administration , management and dispute resolution to the community level , where electedvillage councils ( which requires ２５％ representation by women) make these decisions on behalf of a village assembly . The Act
protects the tenure rights of vulnerable populations such as women , children , the disabled and pastoralists . For women inparticular it nullifies discriminatory customary practices . The village council , with the endorsement of the village assembly , canformulate by‐laws , which are legally binding . Many councils have defined the extent of their land administration areas , ( i .eareas that belong to the community ) and established land committees to advice the councils on land issues . They have also setup village level dispute resolution bodies . The Land Act builds upon existing institutions and brings women directly into villageland governance . However , with regard to conflict resolution , the land committees can only mediate , and any disputing partycan lawfully ignore it . The accountability of the village council to the village assembly are insufficiently defined in law , and arealso not fully independent of the district council .
The radical title to all land in Tanzania is vested in the Executive ( not in the village assemblies ) , which leaves room forcompulsory takings of village land . The slow implementation of the law can also be attributed to the unclear policies andprocedures for its implementation within the lands department , lack of trained personnel , and a possible lack of political will( Manji , ２００１) .
Uganda摧s Land Act of １９９８ shares similarities with Tanzania , and some sharp contrasts . This brief account draws entirely fromMwebaza (１９９９) and Rugadya ( １９９９ ) . The Uganda Land Act of １９９８ was intended to provide security of tenure to all landusers , the majority of whom are customary land holders , to resolve conflicts between registered land owners and their tenantsand to recognize customary tenure as legal and equal to other tenure forms , and to decentralize land administration andmanagement . The Land Act enables holders of customary tenure , who wish to use land as a group , to establish common landassociations to manage and protect their interests in the communal land .
The Act also introduces caveats that require spousal and/ or family consent for land transactions , and nullifies customary
practices that deny women and children use of land . Unlike Tanzania , however , the Act requires the creation of new ,decentralized institutions for land management / administration and land dispute resolution . These include autonomous districtland boards , land committees , land tribunals and sub‐county tribunals — requiring a total of ２７５１ new officials . T raditional/customary authorities are included in the dispute settlement tribunals but only at the discretion of the land committee . UnlikeTanzania , Uganda摧s constitution of １９９５ vests all land in Uganda in the citizens of Uganda and its land act provided a landfund . Also , unlike Tanzania , a Sensitization Focus Group comprising government , civil society and media groups wasestablished to oversee the production and dissemination of information to the grassroots . One major weaknesses in the reform
program is that it lacked an implementation plan and the program was not adequately budgeted ( Bruce , ２００５ ) . The reform isbarely effective , serving to increase the incidence of conflicts , especially among female‐headed households and widows(Deininger and Castagnini , ２００６) .
Land reform in Sahelian West Africa (Benin , Burkina , Mali , Niger , Senegal ) An informative review of the status of landreforms in Sahelian West Africa is provided by Ouedraogo et al (２００６) , out of which the following account is abstracted . ManySahelian countries undertook to reform their land laws in the １９９０s ; of ten as part of or precursor to broader efforts at politicaland administrative decentralization . Land reforms in these countries were aimed at improving tenure security , reducing farmer‐herder conflicts and recognizing and clarifying customary tenure . In the decentralized framework land matters such asallocation , registration etc was devolved to land commissions at district / municipal or village committees . In Niger thecommittees are thought to be technocratic and located at district headquarters distant from communities . However , affirmativeaction rules require that ３ council members at each level are women (Diarra and Monimart , ２００６) .
While reform processes in most of the countries were initiated in the early １９９０s , most of the laws have taken close to a decadeto formulate , and only been adopted from the early to mid ２０００s . Much of this delay has been caused by demands for broaderconsultations from civil society . In Benin for example , a draft land law was drafted in １９９９‐２００１ . It was rejected for lack ofstakeholder representation and broader consultations were further conducted in ２００５ . However , there are difficulties inmediating conflict across multiple interests . In Senegal , the land tenure/ land use chapters in the draft framework law foragrosylvo‐pastoral production were removed to avoid delays in the law摧s approval . It is rather early to comment on the outcomes
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although Niger摧s decentralized land administration system is considered effective : procedures for recognizing land rights aresimple , locally done , and are affordable . Stamm ( undated ) observes that the new land laws of West Africa are unclear ,complicated , contradictory and the source of much uncertainty , which can lead to conflicts . Most of them give power toterritorial authorities that can dispose of land , which contradicts the goal of protecting customary rights .
The pastoral code Many Sahelian countries ( such as Guinea , Mauritania , Mali , Burkina Faso , Niger ) are developing or havedeveloped national laws dealing with access to pastoral resources , and to help reconcile competing resource uses , particularly
pastoralism and agriculture . These laws recognize the rights of way for pastoralists both within countries and across borders .They provide rules for animal movement ( e .g . need for travel documents , specified routes for transhumance , timing ofmovement) but also different categories of pasture ( e .g . reserved pastures vs pastoral development areas vs areas open to
pastoral eg fallow lands , cultivated fields af ter harvest etc) and rights and obligations associated with those different pastureuse categories ( Nianogo and Thomas , ２００４ ) . Niger摧s pastoral code , for example , recognizes common use rights ( relating tograzing areas) and priority use rights in the terroirs d�attache — priority use rights provide pastoralists with clear recognition oftheir rights but without excluding other users ( Ouedraogo at al , ２００６ ) . The laws also specify mechanisms for conflictresolution that integrate traditional authorities and local government (Bruce and Mearns , ２００２) .
However , these laws are relatively recent , not well known to the public , do not have implementation plans , and areincreasingly challenged by the need to ensure the participation of mobile groups ( IIED , ２００６ ) . This new law adds to thecomplexity of natural resource‐related laws in the country , which now exceed １００ , and do not provide a framework for orrequire popular participation ( Konate ２００３ ) . Civil society organizations have devised innovative ways of circumventing theparticipation gap , through lobbying or creating alliances with champions in government ( for Mali see Konate , ２００３ ; for Nigersee IIED , ２００６) .
Coping with �wickedness�: some reflections
Securing the property rights of multiple users in Africa摧s rangelands is a complex problem . Taking East and Sahelian WestAfrica together , securing rights has generally involved several interrelated and complex processes . This includes : legal reformsaimed at recognizing and even certifying customary rights systems often at village level ( i .e . group rights) ; devolving decisionmaking to lower levels ; and a legal recognition and protection of marginalized groups such as women , pastoralists etc . Each ofthese�solutions�, as practice shows , is in turn beset by new problems , key among them are entrenching local participation indecision making , preventing manipulation and capture by elites , lack of accountability of local level institutions and authorities ,and the onset of a new generation of user conflicts arising from the enforcement of these new rules and arrangements . Someaspects of wicked problems can be tamed . The problem of providing low cost registration and certification in Niger , which is asubset of the wider challenge of securing property rights , was resolved i .e . it was tamed .
These innovations are important not least because they have instituted trajectories that break away from previous centralizedmodels of decision making in land and resource management in East and Sahelian West Africa . How can we improve on them ?Recent work in Burkina Faso demonstrates that improving cooperation within groups can remove the pressure for individualswithin groups to want to privatize resources ( McCarthy et al , ２００４ ) . While by‐laws and procedural rules can mandateparticipation and representation of subgroups and likely actions in the event a rule is infringed , increasing avenues throughwhich dialogue and communication can occur seems one way of creating a shared understanding of a common problem within a
group . Existing local institutions and mechanisms provide a logical starting point .
Even though inter‐group relations are challenging , dialogue presents another possibility for smoothing out difficulties andreaching mutually beneficial understandings . The importance of cooperation , dialogue and communication is seen in recentinitiatives to counter elite capture of Indonesia摧s decentralized forestry sector ( Heru et al , under review ) , in restoring resourceaccess and benefits by marginalized minority ethnic groups to Uganda摧s national parks ( German et al , under review ) , in recentefforts to resolve farmer‐herder conflicts in northern Nigeria and which also revitalized longstanding relationships ( Hoffman ,
２００４ ) . In addition to the formal‐legal system , there are cultural and institutional raw materials among groups that can serve asthe locus for building dialogue , but there is also scope for evolving new institutions and norms as the Uganda and Indonesiacases cited here demonstrate .
However , it also seems the case that a focus on rights alone is insufficient . That rights come with obligations can never beoveremphasized , yet most research and practice tends to focus on rights alone . Multiple users have rights and they haveobligations that need to be enforced too . This can help moderate the tensions that arise with the bundled nature of rights andaccess . Addressing the tension generated by the twin goals of securitization of rights of local communities as against creatingmarkets in land to promote investments , especially of international capital , is increasingly crucial . Where groups have full legalownership of land , capacity building for negotiation is key ; however , where residual rights are vested in the Presidency such asin Tanzania , rights and access continue to be threatened . Legal analysts suggest that building the capacity of local actors tonegotiate with foreign investors is critical .
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Because wicked problems are complex , gaining traction necessitates iterative processes that are adequately flexible toaccommodate learning and the adjustment that learning implies . There is thus a strong role for pilots ( see Wiley , ２００８ , forrecent work in Sudan and Afghanistan) . That effort to securing rangelands exhibits the attributes of wickedness is no excusefor inaction . It just means that we should accept that it is a moving target — each solution creates a new problem , which wemust deal with .
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